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Property Law.  Clark v. Buttonwoods Beach Association., 226 
A.3d 683 (R.I. 2020).  A party that claims title via adverse
possession must be able to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that they maintained all elements of adverse possession
simultaneously for the ten-year statutory period.  The period is
broken if any owner recognizes they do not have the best title to the
property.  A party acknowledges that they do not have best title to
the property if they ask permission to improve the land.
Furthermore, there can be no adverse possession if possession by
any one party is not hostile.
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In June 2009, the Clarks purchased two properties in 
Warwick’s Buttonwoods neighborhood.1  One property was a 
residential lot, including a residence and carriage house at 243 
Promenade Avenue, and the other was a residence on Cooper 
Avenue.2  The Buttonwoods neighborhood also includes common 
areas owned and operated by the defendant in this suit, 
Buttonwoods Beach Association (BBA).3  The Clarks, believing the 
Promenade Avenue property (the Property) extended all the way to 
the waterfront, posted “no trespassing/private property” signs at 
the waterfront.4  The BBA requested that these signs be removed, 
as the BBA owned the land, not the Clarks.5 
These events led to a dispute between the BBA and the Clarks 
as to who the legal owner of the property on Promenade Avenue 
was, and the Clarks filed suit for quiet title in Kent County 
1. Clark v. Buttonwoods Beach Ass’n., 226 A.3d 683, 685 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id.  The Clarks tore down the Cooper Avenue residence, merged the
two lots, and moved into the residence at 243 Promenade Avenue.  Id. at 685–
86. The residential and waterfront lots are “separated by a paved street, ap-
proximately twenty feet in width.”  Id. at 686.
3. Id. at 685.
4. Id. at 686.
5. Id.
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Superior Court in March 2014, claiming ownership by adverse 
possession and acquiescence of the BBA.6  The title and claim of 
adverse possession was traced through previous owners to 
determine if the Clarks could establish a valid ten-year period of 
adverse possession.7 
The trial court considered two potential ten-year periods of 
adverse possession: 1986 through 1996 and 2002 through 2012.8  
During the period from 1986 until 1996, the Promenade Avenue 
property was first owned by Peter Weichers, and then by Guy 
Hurley.9  Weichers testified that the real estate agent he purchased 
the property through told him he would own the entire waterfront 
lot in addition to the residential lot.10  Weichers planted shrubs, 
installed a gate, removed and replaced the sea wall, and maintained 
the waterfront for the three years he owned the property.11  During 
this time, he was not contacted by the BBA about the work he did 
on the property.12 
Hurley purchased the property from Weichers in 1989.13  
During this time, Hurley assumed the waterfront lot included the 
area from the hedge to the beach and hired landscapers to maintain 
that area.14  He also built a fence to prevent people from falling.15  
Hurley paid taxes on both properties separately and also served as 
the President of the BBA.16   
The Zigerellis purchased the property in 1999, and installed a 
concrete walkway, bench, gate, and underground sprinkler system 
on the waterfront area.17  Mrs. Zigerelli testified that the BBA 
granted permission for each of those projects, but could not produce 
6. Id.
7. Id. at 686–90.
8. Id. at 692.




13. Id. at 686.
14. Id. at 686–87.
15. Id. at 686.
16. Id. at 686–87.
17. Id. at 687.
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records of her requests.18  Both Mr. and Mrs. Zigerelli testified that 
they knew they did not own the waterfront because of a pamphlet 
from the BBA and the realtor’s disclosure of the property lines, that 
the gate was intended to keep children safe not to prevent access to 
the property.19 
From 2002 to 2012, the property was owned by the Freemans 
and subsequently, the current owners, the Clarks.20  Mrs. Freeman 
testified she knew the BBA owned some of the communal 
properties, citing the tennis courts, baseball field, and a beach area 
as examples.21  The Freemans hired landscapers for the waterfront 
property and had a tree cut down without seeking permission from 
the BBA.22  Mrs. Freeman stated she was not aware of any policy 
requiring the owners of the Promenade Avenue property to ask 
permission to do work on the property.23  When the property was 
listed for sale, photographs of the waterfront were included and 
listed as a part of the residential lot.24  The Freemans also indicated 
that before they had purchased the property, they had asked the 
previous owner’s permission before using the beach and 
occasionally before using the seawall for fishing.25 
During the period since the Clarks purchased the property in 
2009, the only significant change to the property was the addition 
of the “no trespassing/private property” signs.26  Mrs. Clark 
testified that she kept the signs in place after the BBA instructed 
her to remove them in an attempt to, “protect[ ] what she continued 
to believe she had purchased.”27  The Clarks commissioned a survey 
of the property which revealed they did not own the waterfront 
lot.28  However, the surveyor commented that “there was no way a 
layperson would have been able to accurately determine the 
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 685, 687.
21. Id. at 687.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 688.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 686.
27. Id. at 688.
28. Id.
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location . . . using visual markers or cues at the physical 
property.”29  A BBA board member further indicated there has been 
no record that the rule of asking permission to modify the 
waterfront property had been followed for the Promenade Avenue 
property and that he had had no communications with any of the 
former owners about such requests.30  The BBA President from 
2003 through 2006 testified that a letter was sent out in 2001 
advising homeowners to determine exactly what land made up their 
property because it had become “common knowledge” that many 
owners did not actually own everything they thought they did.31 
The case was heard as a nonjury trial in September 2016, 
spanning six days.32  The trial justice, after hearing from the 
witnesses discussed above, issued a decision finding that the Clarks 
had not established the required elements and that they were not 
entitled to quiet title to the waterfront property through adverse 
possession or acquiescence.33  The trial justice found that the 
testimony of Mr. Freeman and Mr. Zigerelli lacked credibility.34  
The Court found that the Clarks were unable to establish that each 
element of adverse possession was simultaneously in effect for 
either ten-year period alleged and that no owner had claimed 
ownership of the waterfront property.35  Final judgement was 
entered in September 2017, and the Clarks appealed the trial court 
decision.36 
On appeal, the Clarks argued that the Hurleys acquired the 
waterfront property through adverse possession in 1996 and that 
possession transferred to each subsequent owner, eventually 
conferring the property to the Clarks.37  They asserted that the 
BBA’s inability to show documentation of requests to improve the 
29. Id. at 688–89.
30. Id. at 689.
31. Id. at 689–90.  The BBA President continued that, “certainly anyone
who looked into it in Buttonwoods, knew that very often, they didn’t own, for 
example, their front lawn.”  Id. 
32. Id. at 686.
33. Id. at 686, 690.
34. Id. at 691.
35. Id. at 691–92.
36. Id. at 690.
37. Id. at 692.
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property and failure to enforce such a policy showed acquiescence 
to the adverse possession.38  The BBA on the other hand, argued 
that no person could have gained adverse possession of land 
belonging to the public and that their filing of a notice of 
interruption in April 2012 would block a claim of adverse 
possession.39 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the trial justice’s 
findings for clear error or overlooked material evidence.40  
According to the Court, in order to obtain property via adverse 
possession, the claimant must prove “‘actual, open, notorious, 
hostile, continuous, and exclusive use of said property under a claim 
of right for at least a period of ten years.’”41  The Court explained 
that the party who claims a right to property via adverse possession 
must establish the required elements with strict proof.42  Strict 
proof, the Court explains, is proof by clear and convincing 
evidence.43  The Court recognized that multiple periods of adverse 
possession by different owners of the Property could be considered 
together under the principle of tacking to build up to the ten-year 
requirement.44 
The Court held that the trial justice did not misconceive or 
misconstrue the evidence introduced at trial.45  The Court further 
held that “based on the findings of the trial justice . . . there was not 
a ten-year period of ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, 
and exclusive use of the property under a claim of right’ across the 
four predecessors in title to the Clarks.”46  The Court reasoned that 
neither period reviewed established adverse possession.47  The 
Court found that Hurley’s possession of the waterfront was not 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 693.
40. Id. at 690.
41. Id. (quoting DiPippo v. Sperling, 63 A.3d 503, 508 (R.I. 2013)).
42. Id. (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 508).
43. Id. at 690–91 (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 508).
44. Id. at 693.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 694.
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hostile because he had installed the steps leading to the beach 
solely for others to have ease of access to the beach, not to claim the 
land as his own.48  The Zigerellis, who owned the property after 
Hurley, said they knew they needed permission from the BBA 
before they could make any improvements on the waterfront 
portion of the land.49  
The Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the 2002 
to 2012 period did not establish adverse possession because the 
Zigerellis were not hostile or exclusive in their possession of the 
property.50  The Court also ultimately upheld the trial justice’s 
determination that the Zigerellis failed to claim ownership of the 
waterfront property because they did not represent to the neighbors 
that they owned the property and allowed neighbors to use the 
land.51  Further, the Court did not overrule the trial court’s finding 
that exclusivity had not been shown during the Freemans’ 
ownership of the property either.52 
While the Court restated its earlier holding that adverse 
possessors do not need to “vigorously assert [their] right at every 
opportunity,” it ultimately upheld the trial justice’s determination, 
based on the trial justice’s findings, there was no ten-year period in 
which all elements of adverse possession were met.53  No series of 
owners sustained actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and 
exclusive possession of the property for the required statutory 
period.54  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Superior Court.55 
COMMENTARY 
The Court stressed the importance of all elements of adverse 
possession persisting for the entire ten-year period.56  While it 
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 692–93.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 693–94 (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 412 (R.I.
2001)). 
54. Id. at 693.
55. Id. at 694.
56. Id. at 693.
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recognized that the apparent owners do not need to actively assert 
their rights to the property for the entire statutory period, the Court 
emphasized that all elements must be clearly and consistently 
established during that time.57  More importantly in the context of 
this case, the Court made clear that the neighbors occasional use of 
the waterfront property, with or without the owners’ permission, 
was not sufficient to break exclusive possession of the property.58  
Instead, the various owners’ recognition that they were not the sole 
owners of the property by requesting permission from the BBA for 
improvements and reference to improvements as public safety 
measures for the neighborhood children interrupted exclusive and 
hostile occupation of the property.59 
The Court takes a very realistic approach to this case.  Its 
recognition that neighbors could access a waterfront property 
without breaking an adverse possessor’s exclusive possession 
represents a true-to-life view of how individuals interact with their 
property.  Only when the property owners explicitly stated that 
they sought permission for improvements or described their 
reasoning for such improvements as a means of improving access to 
the waterfront for others was the exclusivity and hostility of the 
adverse possession called into question.60  Ultimately, the Court’s 
conclusion that the elements of the adverse possession claim were 
not met through clear and convincing evidence was grounded in 
clear examples of various owners of the Promenade Avenue 
waterfront property blatantly recognizing that they did not have 
exclusive possession of the property. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when no series of 
property owners had met the ten-year requirement of actual, open, 
notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession of the 
waterfront property, adverse possession was not achieved.61  The 
various owners’ recognition that the BBA and neighbors had some  
57. Id.  at 693–94.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 694.
60. Id. at 692–93.
61. Id. at 694.
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interest in the property meant that the exclusive and hostile 
elements were not achieved to satisfy a claim of adverse 
possession.62 
 Brooke E. Pearsons 
62. Id.
